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Abstract.  This paper discusses the issue of foodborne disease and international trade in food products from an economic perspective. 
Recent data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show that each year diseases caused by food in the United States may 
cause an estimated 325,000 serious illnesses resulting in  hospitalizations, 76 million cases of gastrointestinal illnesses, and 5,000 
deaths each year.  These diseases pose an economic burden on society: Medical costs and productivity losses from in the U.S. diseases 
caused by four major microbial  pathogens alone are $8.3 billion annually. Food safety concerns may also affect trade in food products. 
 Foodborne disease outbreaks may have lead to significant economic losses in some segments of the food sector, and lead to calls for 
increased protection from imported food safety risks through application of more stringent sanitary and phytosanitary rules.  The new 
framework for adjudicating trade disputes under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade allows measures to protect the public 
from food safety risks on imported foods, but not to if such measures create unnecessary trade barriers.  Creating multinational trading 
rules that accommodate the diverse economic, cultural, and political concerns of trading partners is difficult, but new approaches to 
risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis of trade policies can help promote both free trade and safer food supplies. 
 
Keywords: Food Safety, Food Trade, Economics
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Americans have access to an abundant, diverse, and inexpensive 
food supply, provided by both the domestic agriculture sector 
and by imported foods from abroad.   Despite the high level of 
safety of America’s food supply, foodborne disease caused by 
bacteria, parasites, viruses, and natural and man-made 
chemicals remains a public health problem. Access to 
information about large outbreaks of food-related illnesses and 
death has heightened consumer concerns about the safety of 
their food.   
 
Recent data released by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention show the extent of the problem in the United States. 
They estimate that foodborne diseases cause approximately 76 
million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths in 
the United States each year. Many pathogens (bacteria, 
parasites, and viruses) may cause illness or disease when 
present in foods we consume.  The CDC estimates that known 
pathogens account for an estimated 14 million illnesses, 60,000 
hospitalizations, and 1,800 deaths. Three  pathogens, 
Salmonella, Listeria, and Toxoplasma, are responsible for 1,500 
deaths each year, more than 75% of  those caused by known 
pathogens, while unknown agents account for the remaining 62 
million illnesses, 265,000  hospitalizations, and 3,200 deaths.   
Table 1 presents a summary of these data for several major 
microbial pathogens. 
 
 
 
Pathogen Cases  Hospitalizations  Deaths 
Campylobacter spp.  1,963,141 10,539  99 
Salmonella, non-
typhoidal 
1,341,873   15,609  553 
E. coli 0157:H7  62,458 1,843  42 
E. coli, non-O157:H7 
STEC 
31,229 921  26 
Listeria monocytogenes  2,493 2,299  499 
Total 3.513.694  3,513,694  1,604 
NOTES:
 
Data provided to ERS by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Source: Mead, et. al., 1999. 
 
Table 1 - Estimated Annual Extent of U.S. Foodborne 
Illness for Seven Major Pathogens, 1998 
 
 
Other sources of food safety risk include chemical 
contamination of food--such as nitrates in drinking water and 
pesticide residues on fruits and vegetables.  Although scientists 
believe that the health risks associated with chemical 
contamination of food and drinking water are lower than the 
health risks associated with microbial pathogens, studies show 
that consumers still perceive these as significant risks. 
 
2.  Why Food Safety is an Economic Problem 
 
The price of food, as well as its convenience, appearance, and 
nutritional content, have a major  influence on choices made in 
the marketplace.  Consumer concerns about food safety should 
have a similar impact. In the optimal market scenario,  
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consumers make their purchase decisions possessed of a full and 
correct understanding about how their selections will affect their 
well-being, but unlike most other product characteristics, food 
safety is usually not discernible to consumers at the time of 
purchase.  Therefore, consumer ignorance of the safety of their 
food purchases limits the degree to which demand for safer food 
can lead the market to enhance food safety. 
 
Currently, the market provides few incentives for producers to 
provide levels of food safety beyond those mandated by 
government regulations or to offer the public other than the most 
rudimentary information about the safety of their food product.  
The cost of having products linked to outbreaks of food borne 
illness, both to reputation and sales, does provide some 
incentive for producers to ensure the safety of their products.  
However, the complexity of the process whereby food travels 
from farm to table makes warranting food safety risky business 
for producers.  The liability associated with claims of 100% 
safety, if proven false, is a significant disincentive for producers 
to advertise their food as “safe.”  Constrained from advertising 
"safe" food and thus reaping market rewards, producers have no 
vested interest in making information about the safety of their 
food product more available to consumers.  
 
Consumer pressure necessary to impact the market in the matter 
of food safety will not occur until the information gap is closed.  
Until then, an optimal level of food safety is not likely to be 
achieved within a non-regulated market.  This lack of 
consumers’ food safety information and the lack of producers’ 
incentives to provide it leads to market failure   
 
It would be impossible to provide a risk-free food supply.  Since 
there are costs associated with increasing food safety, society 
must decide how much, if any, it is willing to spend on food 
safety and where these dollars will have the greatest impact.  
The optimum level for food safety would be where the marginal 
cost of creating one more unit of food safety equals its marginal 
benefit. 
 
The marginal costs would be the costs to food processing plants 
to meet new food safety plans and the cost of government 
programs aimed at educating consumers, retailers, and 
foodservice workers about safe food handling.  The marginal 
benefits are the reduced illness and mortality associated with a 
safer food supply. However, since these benefits or goods are 
not traded in the market, how do you assign them a dollar value? 
 
In the next section of this paper, we show how economists have 
measured the costs of unsafe food.  This gives us a benchmark 
by which to measure the benefits of programs and policies that 
improve food safety - the benefits being the reductions in costs 
associated with unsafe food. 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Measuring Food-Safety Costs 
 
Two approaches have been used to measure the costs of 
foodborne illness. The first is the “Cost-of-Illness” (COI) 
approach, which  measures the sum of medical expenses and 
lost productivity due to illness or death. Basically, this approach 
measures the cost of unsafe food as the costs of treating 
foodborne diseases plus lost productivity when victims can’t 
work. 
 
The advantage of the COI approach is that it employs available 
data that are fairly reliable and consistent over time.  Because 
the concepts are both easy to understand and data are obtainable 
from market transactions, COI measures have been widely used 
for several decades.   
 
The COI approach seems to be crudely “economic” in the sense 
that it values lost income and the associated consumption 
expenditures; but in fact the approach does not conform with 
economic theory because it fails to recognize the value that 
individuals may place on (and be willing to pay for)  feeling 
healthy, avoiding pain, or using their free time.  Because the 
COI approach explicitly ignores these valuable aspects of 
health, the method is generally thought to understate the true 
societal benefits from risk reduction.  This method places a 
lower value on reducing risks of the elderly because they have 
low future earnings to forego.  Also, this method attaches a 
rather low value to risk reduction for children, depending on the 
discount rate used to value future earnings of children to the 
present. 
 
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has estimated the COI 
for seven pathogens which are found on some meat and poultry. 
  These estimates are calculated from the number of annual 
foodborne-illness cases and deaths; the number of cases that 
develop secondary complications; and the corresponding 
medical costs, lost productivity costs, and other illness-specific 
costs.   
 
Establishing incidence rates for foodborne illness was 
challenging due in large part to the nature of the illnesses.  Many 
individuals do not recognize food as the cause of their illness 
and often even when they do, they do not consult a physician.  
Finally, physicians do not always recognize the illness as 
foodborne.  As a result the number of cases of foodborne disease 
is vastly underreported.   
 
Once the incidence rate was established medical costs were 
calculated.  Included here were the cost of doctors, hospitals, 
medicines, and supplies.  Productivity losses were calculated for 
time lost from work using a daily wage rate times the amount of 
time lost from work as a proxy for the value of lost output.  
Productivity losses were also calculated for those unable to 
return to work or who died.   
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Using this method, the total cost of foodborne disease from four 
pathogens presented in Table 1 (E. coli O157:H7, Salmonella, 
Campylobacter, and Listeria monocytogenes)  was between 
$1.2 to $6.4 billion annually (Buzby, et. al.).  (It should be noted 
here that these estimates are based on number of cases and 
deaths reported in 1996, not the latest figures cited in Table 1.) 
 
The issue of how to place premature deaths in an economic 
context is a difficult challenge for economists.  Essentially, we 
are asked to respond to the question of “What is a life worth?” 
Two approaches are commonly used.  The first approach says 
that one measure of the economic value of an individual is the 
amount of income he/she earns over his/her lifetime.   In other 
words, one measure of the costs of a premature death from 
foodborne disease is the current dollar value of all future income 
that individual would have earned had he/she not died. This is 
called the “Human Capital” approach to valuing premature 
deaths, as developed by Landefeld and Seskin (1982). 
 
Another approach economists have used is to look at the way 
individuals reveal their attitudes toward risky activities through 
their behavior.  For example, some individuals choose to take 
jobs which have an increased risk of death or injury in return for 
higher wages, such as building skyscrapers, fishing in the arctic 
waters off Alaska, and so forth.  In principle, the value placed on 
an increased risk of premature death in those cases can be 
equated with the extra wages paid to workers to induce them to 
voluntarily undertake these risk.   Viscusi (1993) analyzed labor 
market data for twenty-four high-paying, risky occupations, and 
estimated the extra wages paid to such workers.  He found that, 
when pooled over a large numbers of individuals with various 
risks of job-related premature death, between $3 and $7 million 
would be paid to raise the aggregate risk of death in the labor 
market by one.  That is, to induce enough workers to undertake 
risky jobs with a probability of one extra death, the extra wages 
paid to those workers would be between $3 and $7 million (in 
1990 dollars).   
 
In some economic analysis, then, this estimate has been used to 
place a dollar value on premature deaths. The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission uses Viscusi’s range and/or a $5-
million estimate per life lost in its analysis; the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) uses Viscusi’s range in estimating the 
benefits of the Clean Air Act; and FDA used $5 million in its 
evaluation of new seafood inspection systems.   Buzby et. al. 
(1996) used the midpoint of Viscusi’s range of values to place a 
$5 million cost on each premature death from foodborne 
diseases.   In later analyses, economists at the USDA’s 
Economic Research Service used a different approach. ERS 
modified the labor market approach by taking the age 
distribution of deaths from each pathogen into account, in effect 
treating the value of life as an annuity paid over the average U.S. 
life span at an interest rate of 3.0 percent.  Following age-
adjustment, the assumed cost of each death ranges from $8.4 
million for individuals who died before their first birthday to 
$1.6 million for individuals who died at age 85 or older. 
(USDA/ERS, unpublished estimates). Previous studies (Buzby, 
et. al, 1996) have shown that this approach raises the cost 
estimates considerably. All told, the cost of foodborne illnesses 
and deaths related to the five pathogens studied is $8.3  billion, 
annually. 
 
Pathogen Costs 
($ billion, 1998) 
Campylobacter, spp.  2.4 
Salmonella, non-typhoidal  2.2 
E. coli 0157:H7  0.7 
E. coli, non-O157:H7 STEC  0.4 
Listeria monocytogenes  2.6 
Total 8.3 
NOTES: The total estimated costs include specific chronic 
complications in the case of Campylobacter (Guillain-Barré 
syndrome), E. coli O157:H7 (Hemolytic uremic syndrome), 
and Listeria monocytogenes (congenital and newborn 
infections resulting in chronic disability or impairment).  
Estimated costs for Listeria monocytogenes exclude less 
severe cases not requiring hospitalization 
Table 2 - Estimated Annual Costs Due to Selected Foodborne 
Pathogens, 1998 
 
2.2  Why Economics Matters 
 
These estimates of the social costs of foodborne illness, while 
revealing of the total burden these illnesses place on society, are 
only a starting point.   Economists also are interested in how 
efforts to prevent foodborne illness can reduce this burden, and 
the relationships between the benefits of safer food and the costs 
of achieving this goal.  Ideally, we would want to chose to 
implement regulations and other efforts to control foodborne 
disease only when/if the costs of pathogen reduction are less 
than the benefits of reduced medical costs and productivity 
losses. 
 
In response to increasing concerns about food safety, the United 
States (along with other nations) have taken steps to improve the 
safety of their food supplies.  These steps can be in the form of 
regulations designed to change firm behavior, creation of 
economic incentives through tax or fiscal policy for firms to 
reduce food safety risks, educational campaigns to promote 
consumer awareness and adoption of safer food handling 
practices, or some combination of all of these approaches.   
 
Regulations, by definition, will change the costs of producing 
food – if one assumes that private firms are already operating at 
minimum cost in the absence of regulations.  Some of these 
costs may be passed on to consumers in the form of higher 
prices, some of these costs may be borne by firms in the form of 
lower profits, and some may be passed back to farmers.  The 
role of economics is to measure how large these costs may be, 
and to determine who bears the costs.  The costs, in turn, are 
then compared to the benefits of improving food safety.  To be 
considered justifiable from an economic perspective, the costs of IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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achieving food safety goals (whichever approach is taken) 
should be less than the benefits of improved public health.  The 
benefits of reducing food-safety risk are the reductions in 
medical costs, productivity losses, and costs of premature death 
that derive from programs and policies designed to reduce that 
risk.  To an economist, the programs to achieve this risk 
reduction are desirable if these benefits are greater than the 
costs. 
 
As an example, Crutchfield et. al. (1997) recently conducted an 
analysis of the United States Department of Agriculture’s 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (“HACCP”) 
Pathogen Reduction Rule.  The Rule requires food processors to 
identify food safety hazards and to develop interventions to 
reduce or eliminate these hazards.  In their study, Crutchfield et. 
al. evaluated the potential benefits of the new rules designed to 
reduce microbial pathogens in meat and poultry.  They then 
compared these benefits to the costs of imposing the rule on 
slaughter and processing firms.  They discovered that the 
benefits of the rule exceeded the costs of the regulation as long 
as the rule achieved at least a 17 percent reduction in foodborne 
illness.  
 
Economics can also be useful in setting priorities for further 
research and interventions to prevent foodborne illness, whether 
from domestic or imported foods.  For example, some pathogens 
may be more widespread or cause more illnesses than others, 
but may impose less of a burden on society because the illnesses 
they cause are less severe or may result in fewer premature 
deaths.  Several agencies within the U.S. government are 
currently undertaking a research effort to rank the various 
sources of foodborne disease on the basis of the economic costs 
of those diseases.  This will help set priorities for allocation 
prevention and control efforts across the various sources of 
foodborne disease, domestic or imported. 
 
3.  Food Safety and International Trade 
 
The world market for food is becoming increasingly global in 
scope.  Trade in food products is increasing, particularly for 
minimally processed foods. Imports provide a significant source 
of supply for many foods in the United States, particularly fish, 
shellfish, and fresh fruits and vegetables (see Table 3). While 
consumers benefit from an increase in the variety of food 
choices available, concern remains that imported food may pose 
a safety risk.  
 
Food safety concerns can have an economic effect in 
international trade markets in a number of ways.  Two of the 
most prominent are the potential for outbreaks of foodborne 
disease linked to imported foods to disrupt international markets 
for food products, and the potential for food safety concerns to 
lead to trade barriers through adoption of protective sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations.  We conclude this paper by discussing 
these two issues from an economic perspective. 
 
 
Source 
 
Percent of U.S. consumption 
 
Red Meat 
 
6.5 
 
Fish/Shellfish 
 
55.3 
 
Eggs 
 
0.1 
 
Fresh Vegetables 
 
11.7 
 
Vegetable for Processing 
 
2.3 
 
Fresh Fruits 
 
33.3 
Source: USDA Economic Research Service 
Table 3 - Imports as source of US food supply 
 
3.1  Food Safety Scares may Disrupt Food Markets 
and Trade 
 
In recent years some well-publicized incidents have led to 
increased public concern in the United States about exposure to 
potentially hazardous chemicals and pathogens in the imported 
food. Recent outbreaks of foodborne illness linked to imported 
foods have heightened this concern.  For example, the past year 
has seen outbreaks of illness from Hepatitis A virus on imported 
strawberries and the Cyclospora microbe on imported 
raspberries. Abroad, we have seen the highly-publicized “Mad 
Cow Disease” outbreak in the United Kingdom, and outbreaks 
of E coli O157:H7 in Asia.  
   
Outbreaks of foodborne disease linked to imported foods can 
severely disrupt food markets, causing economic losses for the 
food sector.  The British beef market and trade in U.K. beef 
products was severely impacted by the recent outbreak of “Mad 
Cow Disease.”  An outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 in Japan may 
have caused U.S. exports of beef to that country to temporarily 
drop by as much as 40 percent.  An extreme example from the 
past involved Chilean grapes in to the U.S.  Traces of cyanide 
were found on two grapes tested, and in response trade in this 
product was temporarily halted.  Concern has been raised by 
some in the U.S. about a “cycle of poison;” where pesticides no 
longer approved for use in the U.S. reenter the domestic market 
as residues on imported produce.  
 
In some respect, concern about the safety of imported food 
products may be higher than necessary.  Scientists and 
regulatory personnel generally view contamination by microbial 
bacteria and naturally occurring toxins as greater dangers to 
human health than pesticide residues. Compared with animal 
products (where a relatively small percentage of U.S. supply is 
imported), in relatively few instances has fresh produce been 
identified as a vehicle for carrying disease causing pathogens.  A 
recent study by Zepp, et. al. (1998) found no definitive evidence 
that health risks due to either pesticide residues or microbial 
contamination are greater for imported produce than for 
domestic produce. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Still, public concern in the U.S. remains about the safety of 
imported foods.  There are several reasons why consumer 
concern about food safety may be greater than indicated by 
dispassionate, scientific risk assessments.  One reason for 
continuing consumer concern about foodborne health risks is 
that the health risk are not easily discernable. Unlike some food 
quality problems (such as spoilage or cosmetic flaws), microbial 
and other food-safety risks cannot be easily detected when the 
product is purchased.  Consumers are not able to determine 
whether their hamburger contains E. coli O157:H7, whether 
their chicken contains Salmonella, or whether pesticide residues 
or potentially dangerous viruses are in their fruits and 
vegetables.   So far, testing for microbial or chemical 
contaminants has proved too slow and expensive to become a 
routine part of the food distribution system.  Testing identifies 
some problems, but largely serves to describe the extent of the 
problems rather than serve as an effective filter. Accordingly, 
consumers are not able to make informed decisions about their 
food consumption and possible health risks, and any risk that are 
imposed on them are involuntary in nature.  In short, the risks 
are involuntary.  Experience and empirical evidence suggests 
that consumer preferences for protection from risks of any sort, 
be they foodborne or otherwise, rises when the risks are 
involuntary in nature and not under the control of the individual.  
 
Another factor to be considered in the considerable uncertainty 
about the level of public health risk from foodborne sources.  
Our understanding of the overall risk from foodborne disease is 
incomplete and subject to considerable uncertainty.   Although 
CDC estimates presented earlier show millions of cases of 
foodborne illness, the majority of those estimated cases are from 
unknown sources.  The best available evidence suggest that 
risks of cancer and neurological disease from dietary exposure 
to pesticides in the diet is very low for the typical adult, yet 
consumer concern about pesticide residues remains high.   
 
Consumer concern is also heightened by the uncertainty about 
the eventual outcomes of exposure to foodborne health risks, 
and uncertainty about the effects of dietary exposure on 
particular sub-populations.   While some foodborne illnesses 
may result in a mild case of gastrointestinal distress, others may 
results in severe disability of death.  For example, exposure to 
the pathogen Campylobacter may result in a case of Guillian 
Barre syndrome, a paralytic disorder which can cause lifetime 
paralysis and death (Buzby, et. al, 1997).   Any mention of the 
word "cancer" in a public health debate is bound to raise public 
concern, even if the risks of cancer are low and the eventual 
outcomes far into the future, so consumer fears about potentially 
cancer-causing chemicals in the food supply may be inflated 
beyond what scientific risk easement may imply.  Cancer is 
particularly dreaded, and is sometimes viewed as an irreversible 
outcome. Also, many sub-groups in the population thought to be 
most at risk for foodborne health risks are those groups usually 
afforded the greatest concern and preference for health 
protection: infants, the elderly, and pregnant women. 
 
All these considerations together provide an explanation for 
continued consumer concern about food safety risk and demand 
for risk reduction.  The risks are involuntary in nature, they are 
subject to considerable uncertainty, they may result in 
potentially disastrous outcomes (cancer, disability and death), at 
a small but non-zero probability, and they tend to 
disproportionately affect those for whom society has an 
expressed preference for risk protection. For these reasons, 
public concern has in the past led to demands for protective 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards to protect the public from 
perceived (albeit uncertain) food safety risk.  
 
3.2  Food Safety and International Trade Policies 
Extensive and increasing international agricultural trade (from 
$385.4 billion in 1992 to $463.5 billion in 1997) distributes 
more diverse foods of varying quality to wider markets. Any 
unsafe imported food can impose health costs on society, but 
consumers benefit from increased trade through lower prices, 
year-round supplies, and greater variety and quality.  Therefore, 
countries have incentives to weigh the benefits and costs of 
different mechanisms which promote the twin goals of food 
safety and trade benefits.  Standards and regulations provide 
important mechanisms sure to affect food trade and safety in the 
21st century.  Here we hope to clarify many of the complex 
issues surrounding the adoption of standards and regulations of 
imported foods. 
 
3.3  Reasons for international differences in food safety 
measures 
 
The diverse food safety risks to human health include pesticide 
and veterinary drug residues, food additives, and foodborne 
pathogens.  The magnitude and the causes of the risks vary 
among exporting and importing countries.  Among exporting 
countries, risks vary due to international differences in food 
production practices (for example, use of veterinary drugs), 
geographic distribution of pathogens (some pathogens don’t 
survive in colder climates, for example), plant and livestock host 
factors (herds exhibit varying infection rates), and available 
technology (refrigeration, potable water, for example).  Among 
importing countries, risks vary because of available technology, 
human host factors (proportion of population with greater 
susceptibility to these risks), and consumption patterns (for 
example, routine consumption of raw fish). 
 
Even when risks vary little across countries, assessments of the 
risks may vary due to differences in access to and use of 
advances in basic science, detection technology, and mitigation 
methods.  Several committees under the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (Codex), such as the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and Contaminants, disseminate scientific information 
on foodborne hazards and risk assessment methodology to 
narrow information gaps, paving the way for establishing 
international standards.  But continual development of new IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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agricultural inputs and products, together with regular advances 
in detection and eradication technology, outpace international 
efforts to establish a consensus on risks and mitigation methods. 
 In the interim, some countries may refuse to allow imports of 
products (such as genetically-modified foods or irradiated meat) 
that have been approved for sale in others.  
 
Countries may also choose different policy measures to manage 
similar risks.  Income explains some variation, as consumers in 
wealthier countries may be willing to pay more for higher 
standards.  Also, measures may in part reflect past food safety 
incidents such as low-probability, high-consequence events (for 
example, a botulism outbreak) that heighten consumer demand 
for stricter regulations.  And, countries may choose to manage 
risks differently in response to consumer preferences for other 
food attributes (such as taste) besides safety (Henson and 
Traill).  For example, many European countries use process 
standards to minimize the risks of Listeria in cheese made from 
unpasteurized milk, while the United States bans the sale of 
most of these cheeses. 
 
This complex mosaic of risks and risk mitigation measures 
creates substantial debate among scientists, disagreement among 
food safety regulators, and discord among trading partners.  The 
impact of divergent food safety standards on trade is largely 
unknown, primarily because we lack systematic information on 
the measures themselves and we have underdeveloped methods 
of economic assessment.  In one preliminary exploration, 
however, Roberts and DeRemer surveyed USDA’s foreign 
attachés and representatives from agricultural producer groups.  
They identified questionable technical trade barriers (trade-
restricting regulations that seem primarily aimed at shielding 
domestic producers from competition) and estimated the 
impacts on U.S. exports of agricultural products.  Respondents 
identified 303 barriers in 62 countries that threatened, 
constrained, or blocked an estimated $5 billion of U.S. exports 
of agricultural, forestry, and fishery products (7 percent of the 
total) in 1996.  Food safety barriers accounted for about one-
fourth of the number of restrictions, but about one-half of the 
estimated export revenue losses because they often restrict sales 
of high-value products such as processed foods and meats 
(Table 1).  The survey identified other questionable technical 
barriers--primarily restrictions justified on the basis of 
protecting crops and herds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Food safety attribute 
 
Number 
of 
barriers 
 
Estimated U.S. 
export revenue 
losses 
(percent) 
 
Foodborne 
pathogens 
 
31 
 
12 
 
Food additives 
 
13 
 
45 
 
Veterinary residues 
 
12 
 
8 
 
Residues and 
pathogens 
 
6 
 
9 
 
Multiple attributes 
(including 
genetically modified 
organisms) 
 
5 
 
24 
 
Naturally occurring 
toxins 
 
3 
 
<1 
 
Heavy metals 
 
2 
 
<1 
 
Pesticide residues 
 
1 
 
<1 
 
Total food safety 
barriers 
 
73 
 
100 
Notes: “Barriers” are those  that survey respondents 
judged to be  primarily aimed at shielding  domestic 
producers from international competition.  
 
Source: Roberts and DeRemer 
 
Table 4 - Profile of questionable food safety technical 
barriers to U.S. agricultural exports, 1996 
. 
 3.4   Food safety measures in the multilateral trading 
system 
 
A framework for determining the legitimacy of questionable 
food safety measures emerged from the 1986-93 Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement).  SPS rules in the original (1947) General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allowed measures 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and health” but 
stipulated that measures should not constitute disguised 
restrictions or create unnecessary trade barriers.  Despite these 
rules, SPS regulations proliferated and began to disrupt trade.  
Uruguay Round negotiators therefore aimed to create more IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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stringent rules, primarily by requiring that regulatory decisions 
be based on scientific risk assessments.  Negotiators believed 
that this would encourage countries to adopt measures that 
balanced desirable benefits and undesirable risks of 
international trade, while discouraging measures designed 
simply to protect domestic markets.  
 
Creating multilateral rules that set parameters for food safety 
measures is a delicate challenge because of the trade-offs 
between commerce and human health risks.  Some fear that the 
Agreement is intended to promote “downward harmonization” 
of national standards to facilitate trade.  Recognizing these 
political concerns, negotiators agreed to endorse, rather than 
oblige, the adoption of international standards.  Moreover, the 
Agreement does not stipulate restrictions on the economic costs 
that can factor into decisions to mitigate human health risks.  
This provides leeway for countries to adopt measures that 
achieve incremental risk reductions at exorbitant cost.  The U.S. 
Statement of Administrative Action to Congress states that the 
Agreement “explicitly affirms the rights of each government to 
choose its levels of protection including a ‘zero risk’ level if it 
so chooses” (President of the United States).  However, the 
Agreement stopped short of explicitly allowing measures to be 
based on “consumer concerns” (subjectively-assessed risks), as 
advocated by some countries.   
 
Controversy over multilateral rules for food safety measures is 
compounded by the fact that most measures apply equally to 
domestic and foreign producers (are “facially neutral”), raising 
questions about the degree of protectionism that these measures 
could actually provide.  In reply, exporters point to several 
instances in which their interests are harmed by facially neutral 
measures that are tailored for domestic production systems.  
Facially neutral measures can disadvantage foreign producers if 
in fact the foodborne risks are lower in the products of the 
exporting country than in the importing country.  For example, 
exporters of range-fed cattle have objected to cost-increasing 
process measures in importing countries where the norm is 
intensive feed-lot production. 
 
The SPS Agreement has averted and defused a number of trade 
problems over the past four years.  However, the outcome of the 
single food safety dispute to advance to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Appellate Body -- the U.S./Canadian 
complaint about the European Union’s (EU’s) ban on the use of 
growth hormones in domestic and imported beef -- will likely 
dominate judgment about the Agreement’s effectiveness for 
some time.  The Appellate judges ruled that although the ban 
was not discriminatory or a disguised restriction on trade, there 
did not appear to be a “rational relationship” between the ban 
and the evaluated health risks, and therefore the ban was not 
based on a risk assessment.  This decision suggests that the 
WTO will rule against measures based on popular 
misconceptions of risks as well as more overtly discriminatory 
measures. 
 
3.5  Multilateral coordination mechanisms and private 
systems approaches 
 
Many countries have shown an increased interest in food safety 
issues, as seen by the United Kingdom’s efforts to create a 
single food safety agency, the series of new U.S. food safety 
initiatives, and regulatory reorganization efforts by Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia.  In response to cross-border spillovers, 
arbitrage pressures, and other trade-related tensions, countries 
are adopting multilateral coordination mechanisms such as 
mutual recognition, coordination, and harmonization (Sykes).  
Mutual recognition means a country explicitly accepts the 
standards, certification procedures, and regulations of other 
countries (for example. U.S. inspection of meat is accepted for 
their imports).  Coordination takes convergence one step further 
by jointly designing adjustments to each countries’ policies 
(using, for example, WHO control procedures for 
communicable diseases).  Harmonization entails even higher 
levels of convergence such as regional or world standards or 
agreements.  However, greater coordination may add costs.  For 
example, if a group of countries agrees to only trade foods  that 
meet a particularly high standard, then imports not meeting 
these standards will not be available to consumers, reducing 
consumer choice. 
 
As with food safety regulations, private system approaches to 
reduce food safety risks are becoming more widespread and 
stringent and are evolving under the influence of the SPS 
agreement (Caswell and Henson).  Private system approaches 
include self-regulation, vertical integration (to ensure 
quality/safety of inputs, for example), Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, and third party 
certification such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (such as, the ISO 9000 series or “EN 29000" in 
Europe).  HACCP essentially identifies, monitors, and controls 
hazards at critical control points in food production and 
processing.  Although still used in its original form as a 
voluntarily-adopted private management tool by particular 
firms, some government regulations also use HACCP as 
performance or process standards (Caswell and Hooker).  These 
private-sector approaches do not necessarily enhance food 
safety; effective implementation is key.  For example, Gill 
advocates microbial testing for truly effective HACCP systems.  
Statistical Process Control (SPC), another internationally-
recognized innovation, also shows promise for reducing food 
safety risks (Bisaillon et al.).  SPC uses standardized sampling 
procedures to reject or accept lots to reach a desired level of 
quality or safety.  
 
These private-sector approaches are often intertwined with each 
other (ISO standards often use HACCP and SPC principles, for 
example) and with multilateral coordination mechanisms (such 
as Codex HACCP standards).  Countries and firms within 
countries may use private system approaches differently, and 
this difference influences the marketing of food safety 
internationally.  In general, the greater the coordination of IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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multilateral mechanisms and private approaches among firms 
and nations, the more they will be able to provide verifiable and 
valuable information to trading partners and facilitate trade. 
 
4.  Food safety and trade issues in the 21st century 
 
The 21st century will bring increased globalization of the food 
supply, the continuing emergence of new foodborne pathogens, 
growing understanding of food safety risks to human health and 
associated trade impacts, and increasing demand for higher 
levels of food safety, particularly among developed countries.  
Food safety and international trade issues have so far been 
handled with relatively few contentious disputes, considering the 
enormous volume of internationally-traded food and the 
complexity of the issues.  Countries vary tremendously in terms 
of risk exposure levels, regulatory measures, and access to and 
use of relevant science, technology, and mitigation methods.  
International differences in public perceptions, attitudes, and 
acceptance of food safety risks, such as in the hormone case, 
will continue to complicate international standard setting.    
 
Perhaps in some instances, trade friction could be reduced if 
each country based food safety measures on a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA).  These analyses could provide convenient 
normative reference points that might help countries establish a 
more formal, systematic, and uniform basis for understanding 
tradeoffs, possibly leading to the adoption of fewer or less 
severe trade restrictive measures.  The economic paradigm 
presented earlier in this paper for analysis of U.S. food safety 
policies shows how CBA could be applied in an international 
setting. On the other hand, CBA relies on interpretation and its 
use may change the focus of discussions, but not diminish trade 
friction. 
 
Multilateral coordination mechanisms on food safety issues will 
become increasingly important determinants of trade patterns.  
Trade analysts and policymakers should be able to help 
determine the most effective future mechanisms for fostering the 
international exchange of safe food.  Public educational 
campaigns (like safe meat handling information) may also 
continue to play a larger role, particularly in developed 
countries.  Meanwhile, as a result of market incentives, product 
liability actions, and regulation, private system approaches will 
likely become even more widespread and intertwined with each 
other and with multilateral coordination mechanisms.   
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